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ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUSH
PILOT PROGRAM ON CROSS-BORDER
TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO
Meredith Vesledahl*

INCE 1982, Mexican trucks entering the United States have been
confined to operate only within the border of commercial zones extending approximately twenty-five miles into the United States,
where they must transfer their cargo to American vehicles.1 One of the
requirements of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was that the United States must gradually lift this moratorium on Mexican motor carriers and allow these carriers to operate beyond the commercial zones. 2 This requirement, however, had yet to be fulfilled, with
no substantial steps taken towards the lift of the moratorium, until February 24, 2007, when the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Mary E. Peters,
and the Mexico Secretary of Communications and Transportation, Luis
Tellez Kuenzler, announced a demonstration project that would finally
3
execute the NAFTA trucking provisions.
The purpose of the proposed demonstration project, according to the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, is "to demonstrate the effectiveness of the safety programs adopted by Mexico-domiciled motor
carriers and the monitoring and the enforcement systems developed by
DOT [Department of Transportation]." ' 4 The demonstration project is
limited to one year and will allow up to one hundred Mexico-domiciled
motor carriers to operate beyond the border commercial zones and transport international cargo throughout the United States. 5 In accordance
with the NAFTA trucking provisions, this project only involves the transport of international cargo, with the transport of domestic cargo reserved
for U.S. carriers. 6 Consequently, Mexican carriers will not be permitted
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to transport domestically point-to-point within the United States and will
only be able to load in Mexico and unload in the United States, or alternatively, to load in the United States and unload in Mexico. 7 Additionally, "[u]p to 100 U.S.-domiciled motor carriers will be granted reciprocal
rights to operate in Mexico for the same [one-year] period."'8 And, all
Mexican participants operating within the United States under the project will be obliged to comply with all of the current U.S. safety
standards. 9
As several U.S. and Mexican trucking companies have been given the
authority to make long-haul deliveries under the demonstration project, 10
there have been outcries from various U.S. groups to halt the implementation of this project.'1 For example, on August 29, 2007, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, together with other environmental and
highway safety groups, filed an emergency injunction in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals to block the Bush administration from opening the U.S.
border to Mexican trucking companies.' 2 The Ninth Circuit ruled against
the Teamsters union,' 3 but this group's continued opposition to the program raises serious questions about the implications of the program. Although the group focuses their arguments on the safety and
environmental implications of the demonstration program, fears over
outsourcing and increased competition from Mexican truckers are obviously of utmost importance to the group.' 4 As more and more companies
are granted access under the demonstration program, the question of
whether the economic benefits of this program will outweigh the economic disadvantages remains open for debate.
Currently, the greatest economic obstacles of the pilot program concern the potential loss of income by American truckers.' 5 These truckers
fear that because the labor costs and fuel costs are cheaper in Mexico
than in the United States, companies in the United States will hire Mexican trucks instead of U.S. trucks in order to reduce their costs.' 6 Mexican
the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit, H. Transportation Comm., 108th Cong.

(2001) [hereinafter Hearing on NAFTA] (testimony of Peter F. Allgeier, Deputy
United States Trade Representative).
7. Hearing on NA FTA, supra note 6.

8. Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46264.
9. Id. at 23884.
10. News Release, Second U.S. Trucking Company, Second Mexican Trucking Company Cleared to Participatein Cross-Border Trucking Demonstration Project, Fed.

Motor Carrier Safety Administration No. 07-07 (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/about/news/news-releases/2007/091907.htm.
11. See, e.g., Free Trade and Fireballs:Coming to America in an 18-wheeler, supra note
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Brotherhood of Teamsters (Aug. 29, 2007), http:lwww.teamster.orgl07newslnr070828.
13. Free Trade and Fireballs; Coming to America in an 18-wheeler, supra note 1.
14. John Gallagher, Racing for NAFTA Freight, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 12, 2007, at 1.

15. Billie Thomas, DOT Law Suit to Stop Mexican Trucks on American Highways,
Helium (2007), http://www.helium.com/tm/317283/ooida-owner-operatorindependent.
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trucks can fill up with enough gas in Mexico to run 1800 miles before they
need to refuel in Mexico, thus keeping fuel costs significantly lower than
with U.S. trucks, which must fill up with the higher U.S. gas prices. 17 By
filling up in Mexico, Mexican carriers also avoid state or federal fuel
taxes, further decreasing their transportation costs. 1 8 Additionally, the
Teamsters claim that on average a qualified Mexican driver earns seven
dollars per hour, whereas a U.S. driver earns at least eighteen dollars per
hour. 19 Consequently, opposition groups argue that these lower labor
and transportation costs for Mexican carriers will result in lower rates
than U.S. carriers can offer and ultimately lure shippers to employ the
20
Mexican carriers to haul freight rather than the U.S. carriers.
While the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) argues that the pilot program will have a minimal economic impact on U.S.
carriers because "Mexico-domiciled motor carriers cannot compete
against U.S.-domiciled carriers for point-to-point deliveries of domestic
freight cabotage within the United States, 2 1 interest groups have argued
that the lack of supervision currently in place for the pilot program would
leave the U.S. border completely open and allow Mexican trucks to operate throughout the United States in blatant disregard of cabotage laws. 22
Under cabotage laws, Mexican truckers are restricted to "driving to their
delivery location and picking up a load in that same area which is [destined for] Mexico. ''2 3 However, there is currently no mechanism in place
to ensure compliance with these laws, leaving Mexican truckers within
the demonstration project free to drive anywhere in the United States
unsupervised and without impediment. 24 Additionally, opposition points
to the fact that only a small percentage of operating authority violations
are detected, and the FMCSA has no information as to how many of
these detected violations entailed a violation of cabotage law. 25 This uncertainty as to the potential enforcement of cabotage law further aggravates the fear that the Mexican trucks will take business away from the
26
U.S. trucks and trigger a decline in jobs and income for U.S. truckers.
Those groups most likely to be negatively impacted by the program are
the smaller carriers and those companies that have specialized in the border transfer process. 2 7 The demonstration project would most likely create an increased competition for smaller carriers in the United States,
"causing a potential strain on the trucking industry. '2 8 Further, because
17. Id.
18. Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 46285 (Aug. 17, 2007).
19. Ricardo Castillo Mireles, Mexican Trucks to Cross U.S. Border, LOGISTICS TODAY,
Apr. 2007 at 1, 17.
20. Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46285.
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Id.
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most of the commercially available U.S. insurance policies do not cover
travel within Mexico, most likely only large self-insured carriers will have
access to the Mexican market. 29 Thus, small business carriers will probably be excluded from the Mexican market while simultaneously experiencing increased competition within the U.S. market. 30 Trucking
companies that specialize in the border crossing process will also be significantly impacted by the demonstration program, as the project would
streamline the currently inefficient process. 31 Those trucking companies
"whose business has disproportionately been border-to-destination
moves will be hurt if they are not able to leverage their in-country delivery competency into securing moves from origin."'3 2 The breadth of the
of
impact on these trucking companies will likely depend on the strength
33
the partnerships that these companies form with U.S. companies.
These potential disadvantages, however, cannot overshadow the fact
that NAFTA has proved to be a success in expanding U.S. trade and creating increased competitiveness for manufacturers. 34 In fact, between
1993 and 2000, exports of U.S. merchandise to Mexico rose 170 percent,
and these exports supported around 1.2 million American jobs. 35 Further, U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico are more than double what they
were prior to 1993, and by eliminating tariffs NAFTA has lowered prices
for consumers in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. 36 And, while
Mexico has increased the number of factories manufacturing goods for
export, the United States continues to be the leading supplier of theses
factories, providing an estimated 82 percent of components to the Mexican factories. 37 Consequently, the amount of U.S. goods exported within
as fast as the amount of
North America has increased almost two times
38
U.S. goods exported to the rest of the world.
The trucking industry in particular has served an important part in enhancing U.S. economic growth. 39 For example, in 2006, trucks transported 219.4 billion dollars worth of goods, over 80 percent of the value
of the surface trade between the United States and Mexico. 40 The industry's growth under NAFTA helped, in turn, to "catalyze border industri29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Erik Markeset, The Positive Impact of the Change Allowing Mexican Truckers to
Operate in the U.S., SUPPLY CHAIN DIGEST, Mar. 19, 2007, http://scdigest.com/As-

sets/Experts/Transportunities_07-03-13.php?cid=1116.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Hearing on NAFTA, supra note 6.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gallagher, supra note 14 at 1.

39. James P. Worthington, Safe, Reciprocal Crossborder Trucking, TRAFFIC WORLD,

Apr. 9, 2007, at 1.
40. Id.
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alization" in both the United States and Mexico. 4 1 The population of the
Mexican states bordering Texas had increased 22 percent from 1990 to
2000, while the population of U.S. border towns had increased 29 percent.42 This population increase can be attributed to the increase in available jobs resulting from more and more facilities and services opening
43
within these border towns.
One of the greatest booms of the NAFTA trucking industry is the incredible growth of Mexico's maquiladora industry.4 4 The maquiladora
plants typically import U.S. parts, assemble them, and immediately ship
the finished products back to the United States. 45 On the return to the
United States, "the shipper pays only such return import duties as are
'46
applicable to the value added by the manufacturing process in Mexico."
Since 1994, when NAFTA was implemented, through March 2000, the
maquiladora industry has been the most vibrant area of the Mexican
economy, adding 1,400 new plants and generating around 640,000 new
jobs. 47 In addition to benefiting the Mexican economy and securing new
jobs for Mexican workers, the growth of the maquiladora industry has
supported the U.S. economy more than U.S. production sharing arrangements with every other country. 48 Because the maquiladoras rely heavily
on U.S. suppliers for their parts, their growth in turn stimulates the
growth of the American economy. 49 Consequently, because of the maquiladora industry's effect on employment, trade, and commercial traffic
between the United States and Mexico, the border areas of the two coun50
tries continue to achieve economic significance for both countries.
But, even with the great role that the trucking industry has played in
the growth of the maquiladora industry and the U.S. economy, motor
carriers have not yet had the opportunity to utilize fully the benefits of
free trade under NAFTA.5 1 Since NAFTA went into effect, "cross-border truck traffic has soared by 170%... with over 4.2 million truck cross41.

Susan Combs, Special Report, State Functions at the Texas-Mexico Border and
Cross-Border Transportation, Window on State Government (Jan. 2001), http://
www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/border/sfatbl.html.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., id.; Dave Hannon, Logistics Providers Increase Focus on Mexico,
PURCHASING MAGAZINE ONLINE,

Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.purchasing.com/arti-

cle/CA6470860.html.
44. Combs, supra note 41.
45. William C. Gruben and Sherry L. Kiser, NAFTA and Macquiladoras:Is the Growth
Connected?, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, June 2001, http://www.dallasfed.org/

research/border/tbe-gruben.html.
46. Id.
47. Combs, supra note 41.
48. J.F. Hombeck, Maquiladorasand NAFTA: The Economics of U.S.-Mexico Production Sharing and Trade, C.R.S. Report 98-66 E, Jan. 27, 1998, http://digital.library.
unt.edu/govtdocts/crs/permalink/meta-crs-812:1/

49. Id.
50. Combs, supra note 41.
51. See, e.g., Worthington, supra note 39.
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ings in 1999."52 Only twenty-five ports of entry along the border process
all of this commercial vehicle traffic, with seven of the ports carrying 91
percent of the cross-border truck traffic. 53 This booming cross-border
trade in only a few ports "aggravates traditional border transportation
54
bottlenecks, resulting in unprecedented congestion at border crossings."
Part of this congestion is due to the industry procedure of the maquiladoras. 55 The maquiladoras' operations use the "just-in-time" manufacturing method so that they produce goods only as orders are received and
then ship the orders the same day.5 6 As a result, most of the Mexican
trucks "carrying finished goods are released in the afternoon in large
batches and attempt to cross the border at the same time. . . -57 This
58
congestion leads to inefficiency and increased costs.
The inefficiency and congestion at cross-border ports can also largely
be attributed to the disorganized requirements of governmental agencies. 59 A truck entering the United States may have to handle as many as
six U.S. governmental agencies: Customs, the Department of Agriculture,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), the Department of Transportation, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. 60 Each of these agencies has its own paperwork and inspection procedures, thus leading to a further backlog of trucks and longer
61
delays.
Additionally, the procedure for the transportation and delivery of
goods is very complex, and requires the use of three different trucks to
deliver a single load of freight from Mexico to the United States. 62 During the transportation process, "a long-haul truck first transports the
trailer of goods to a staging yard near the border. A short-haul drayage
company then shuttles the trailer to the border, where the company pays
'63
all necessary duties and Mexican customs brokers prepare documents.
Once the trailer passes through Mexican customs inspection, it crosses
the border, where U.S. customs brokers prepare further documents, and
the truck continues to a primary inspection station. 64 At the primary inspection station, the customs inspectors review the truck's documentation, and, depending on such factors as the contents of the trailer or the
52. Julie Schneider, NAFTA & Transportation: Impacts on the U.S.-Mexico Border,
BORDERLINES, June 2000, available at http://americas.IRC-online.org/borderlines/
PDF/BL67.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.

58. Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. to Allow Mexican Trucks; Pilot Program Resolves
NAFTA Issue but Upsets Teamsters, Lawmakers, WALL

59. Schneider, supra note 52.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Hearing on NAFTA, supra note 6.

63. Schneider, supra note 52.
64. Id.

ST. j.,

Feb. 24, 2007, at A.3.
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queue order, the truck may then be obliged to progress to a secondary
inspection station. 65 After the inspection procedures are complete, the
truck progresses to a drayage yard where its goods are shifted to a U.S.
long-haul carrier charged with delivering the goods within the United
States.66 Backlogs in any one of these steps will lead to increased traffic
and additional delays at the border. 67 Further, the same inefficient pro68
cess must be used to carry goods from the United States to Mexico.
This cumbersome procedure becomes very costly for suppliers, causing
an increase in transactions costs, whose burden is born by producers and
consumers, as well as a decrease in potential cross-border trade. 69 For
example, the current border crossing process, on average, adds $85 to
$120 per crossing to the border crossing costs as well as five hours to the
delivery time.7 0 Border crossing services already cost $287 to $639 per
truck, so the added transaction costs significantly increase an already expensive process. 71 Additionally, as result of the procedure, "trucks delivering finished goods to a long-haul truck on the U.S. side return to
Mexico empty, while trucks delivering raw materials to maquiladoras in
Mexico cross back to the [United States] empty. 72 This leaves an estimated 47 percent of containers entering the United States empty, which
produces additional traffic and further minimizes the prospective value of
the cross-border trade. 73 Further, the Department of Transportation estimated that the drayage system alone results in 400 million dollars in additional costs. 74 These additional costs do not include other costs related to
warehousing, delays, and other costs that are more difficult to quantify,
so that increased costs most likely greatly exceed the 400 million dollar
figure. 75 The added expenses hike the cost of merchandise up as much as
35 percent, the cost of which is paid by the owner and translated into
76
costs for consumers, wrecking havoc on competitive pricing.
In response to the current inefficiencies in the cross-border trade, many
logistics providers have made attempts to increase their offerings around
the U.S.-Mexico border and to streamline the process of shipping across
the border. 77 For example, "[in July, DHL introduced a new cross-bor65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Schneider, supra note 52.
69. Alan K. Fox, Joseph F. Francois & Pilar Londono-Kent, Measuring Border Crossing Costs and Their Impact on Trade Flows: The United States-Mexican Trucking
Case (Apr. 30, 2003) (unpublished paper, presented at the 6th Annual Conference
on Global Economic Analysis, the Hague, the Netherlands), at 6 available at
https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res-display.asp?RecordlD=1282.
70. Markeset, supra note 31 at 7.
71. Fox, supra note 69.
72. Schneider, supra note 52.
73. Id.
74. Worthington, supra note 39.
75. Id.
76. Ricardo Castillo Mireles, Mexican Trucks Ahoy!, LOGISTICS TODAY, June 2007, at
p. 14.
77. Hannon, supra note 43.
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der service based out of Harlingen, Texas, capable of handling triple the
volume of its previous offering as well as heavier palletized freight and
non-conveyable material to meet the growing logistics needs" of the border towns. 78 Additionally, FedEx has opened two border facilities, one in
Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and the other in El Paso, Texas, to facilitate the
transportation of goods across the border. 79 According to Ed Clark,
president of FedEX Trade Networks, through the opening of these two
border facilities, FedEx "looks to simplify the supply chain process by
managing the transportation, brokerage and distribution of shipments
that cross the Mexico-U.S. border on a regular basis. .".. -80 Accordingly,
this "expanded solution" will help FedEx "work hand-in-hand with maquilas ... as part of their supply chain, so they can benefit from a simplified shipping and customs clearance process managed entirely by
8
FedEx."l
As the need for a more efficient cross-border transportation system is
evident, the opening of the U.S.-Mexico border to a limited number of
trucks under the demonstration program appears to be a step in the right
direction. With the opening of the border, the inefficient process of offloading and reloading goods at the border will be simplified.82 The previously wasted time and manpower used in the offloading and reloading
of goods will be better spent elsewhere, increasing delivery times and
lowering costs for production delays.8 3 Additionally, American trucking
companies will have the ability to compete for deliveries within Mexico,
increasing profits and increasing demand for U.S. truck drivers.8 4 The
demonstration project could thus, according to investment firm Morgan
Keegan, "serve to benefit the U.S. truckload industry as a whole by easing the tight driver market that has served as an inflationary cost for
many carriers .... -"85 Truck brokers could also benefit from the program
by looking to connect Mexican truckers with backhauls, for unless these
truckers find a backhaul they will return to Mexico empty. 86 Consequently, truck brokers could become the ideal participant to manage this
87
new market, which would, in turn, benefit the U.S. economy.
Moreover, not only will the trucking industry as a whole benefit within
the United States, but also those U.S. carriers owning a stake in Mexican
companies could stand to gain a tremendous amount of revenue. 88 Many
U.S.-based trucking companies "have invested in the Mexican infrastruc78. Id.
79. Press Release, FedEx Expands Cross-Border Solutions to Facilitate Trade Along
Mexico-U.S. Border, Aug. 22, 2007, http://news.van.fedex.com/node/4358.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. David T. Griswold, Ban on Mexican Trucks a Setback for U.S.-Mexican Trade,
NAFTA, C. N.Y. BUS. i., July 6, 2001, at 18.
83. Id.
84. See generally id.
85. Gallagher, supra note 14.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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ture and have a commercial presence in the country." 8 9 For example, the
U.S. truckload carrier Celadon Group owns Jaguar, a Mexican trucking
operation that operates 250 trucks in Mexico and produces about 35 percent of Celadon's business. 90 Under the demonstration program, freight
can move "directly from origin to destination" and, accordingly, "eliminate inefficiencies at the border and allow Celadon to use Mexican drivers for its cross-border moves." 9 1 Thus, unsurprisingly, the National
Association of Courier Enterprises, which boasts such members as DHL,
UPS, and FedEx, supports the pilot project and claims that the "project
'92
will make trade easier for both countries.
Ultimately, although there is a valid fear for U.S. truckers of outsourcing and increased competition with Mexican drivers, the potential economic benefits of the demonstration program seem to support the
implementation of the program. The streamlining of the currently inefficient cross-border practices, as well as the opening of the market to additional goods and to further trade with Mexico, suggest that allowing
border access to both Mexican and U.S. trucks would provide a much
needed change to the infrastructure controlling the cross-border trade as
well as stimulate the U.S. economy and trade.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Mireles, Mexican Trucks to Cross U.S. Border, supra note 19.
Gallagher, supra note 14.
Id.
Mireles, Mexican Trucks to Cross U.S. Border, supra note 19.
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